PUERTO RICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
NEW YORK CITY AND PUERTO RICO

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The contrast with the unusually high voter turnout in Puerto Rico inevitably arises in any discussion of the extremely low rate of political participation among Puerto Ricans in the United States. This poses a number of problems for conventional wisdom on the role of poor and working class people in the American political system.

It has been estimated that in New York City less than one-third of the eligible Puerto Ricans are registered to vote, with the turnout in some primarily Puerto Rican districts recently being as low as 5 percent of the eligible voters.¹ In Puerto Rico, on the other hand, gubernatorial elections since 1948 have attracted from 73 percent to 87 percent of registered voters across socio-economic lines.²

Despite this divergence between the two settings, no systematic treatment of Puerto Rican political participation within such an island/metropolis comparative framework has been attempted beyond that contained in Jennings’ recent study of Puerto Rican political leadership patterns in New York City.³ Simple recognition of the differences in levels of participation between these settings, much less of this as a theoretical and practical problem requiring study, is difficult to find in the literature on the Puerto Rican experience in the United States.⁴

Since participation was not the focus of Jennings’ study of Puerto Rican leadership, his treatment of the problem of Puerto Rico-New York City differences in electoral involvement among Puerto Ricans was only suggestive. This chapter will attempt to put Jennings’ treatment of this problem into a more systematic framework in order to develop a more adequate explanation of its meaning and its implications. Such an undertaking will require an examination of Puerto Rican participation in both island and city contexts upon which to base a comparative analysis that can be applied to the political realities of Puerto Ricans in New York. Before doing so, however, a number of theoretical issues that lie at the center of this problem and which involve the more common explanations of the low participation rate of Puerto Ricans in the United States will be briefly discussed.

The central problem that this comparative study intends to clarify is how to conceptualize the relationship between poor and working class social position and levels of political participation, especially as it is applied to the situation of a racial-ethnic group like the Puerto Rican. I
begin by presenting those notions of why Puerto Ricans do not participate in the United
States that have received the most attention in the literature. These, it appears, can be reduced
to three general categories of explanations: 1) class bias; 2) political culture; and 3) group-
based theories of participation.

Perhaps one of the more widely accepted explanations as to why the poor do not participate in
the United States is that attributed to the indirect effects of socioeconomic status. In this
category there are a number of studies that range from arguments that poverty breeds a lower
class culture that dooms the poor to political inertia and irrationalism\(5\) to simple descriptions
of the relationship between poverty and the lack of resources and information necessary for
participation.\(6\)

A second set of theories that attempts to explain the low participation of a group like the
Puerto Ricans in the United States bases itself on the political culture of the group. Puerto
Ricans are either seen as not having brought with them from Puerto Rico the necessary or
appropriate cultural traditions for participation,\(7\) or are simply identified as a group with either
a low level of “participant” political culture,\(8\) or as one that is not really “Puerto Rican” at all
anymore but simply a marginalized and culturally confused “quasi-ethnic.”\(9\)

A third major approach to this problem is based on the nature and location of the group.
These range from viewing low participation as a result of the group’s lack of assimilation, high
levels of political alienation, isolation, lack of efficacy, and so on,\(10\) to that of a lack of group
consciousness.\(11\) Some have argued that the major problem is a lack of equal opportunity to
vote that is tied to either persistent patterns of discrimination\(12\) or to variations in the political
climate of the country.\(13\)

There are in addition, other approaches to this problem that have not assumed as much
prominence. One is individual-level analyses that focus on questions of a person’s exposure to
politics and psychological involvement.\(14\) Another relates low levels of participation to
contentment with conditions in this country or what Eulau has called the “politics of
happiness.”\(15\) A third “subsidiary” explanation is the “environmental,” “institutional,” or
“structural” approach. Here one sees as the distinctive elements discussions of such things as
changes in rules, registration procedures, party competition, population size, central versus
peripheral location, legal sanctions, party-group linkages, the role of the media, level of
modernization, and the nature of elections as they affect levels of participation.\(16\) Although
there has been increasing evidence of the explanatory strength of these structural factors, there
has at the same time appeared to be some resistance to according them a sufficiently important
role in the dominant theories of participation.

One problem in this regard has been the apparent dominance of behavioralism in voting
studies and its neglect, almost by definition, of the structural aspects of participation, except
possibly in an ad hoc manner to explain the most blatant obstacles to participation. A possible
reason for this could be the feeling that externally-stimulated participation is somehow artificial. However, as Huntington and Joan Nelson have concluded in their discussion of “autonomous” --- as opposed to “mobilized” --- participation, “there are strong arguments for including both ... categories in a broad-gauged exploration of political participation.”

If participation is studied on a cross-national, or even cross-regional, basis, it is the structural differences between political systems that gain in prominence in explaining differences in levels of participation. The problem then shifts from simply explaining political behavior to understanding the reasons for the particular structuring of that behavior in a particular setting.

The comparative study of Puerto Rican political participation in New York City and Puerto Rico, I will argue, can only be meaningful within such a structural context. The analysis that follows will show that class bias, political culture, group-based, individual-level and contentment theories of participation do not sufficiently capture the central dynamic behind the differences in Puerto Rican participation in these two settings. Rather, the structural basis of the problem will be elaborated in a more systematic manner than offered previously in order to demonstrate its greater explanatory usefulness as well as the manner in which it poses a challenge to dominant notions of the political participation of Puerto Ricans, and of the poor and working class in general. The basic problem is the effect of movements between a dependent capitalist and an advanced capitalist social formation on the level of political participation of the Puerto Rican poor and working class.

PUERTO RICAN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN NEW YORK CITY

In New York City, Puerto Ricans number over one million, representing some 13 percent of its total population. Puerto Ricans are one of the most recent of the larger racial-ethnic groups to come to New York and one of the earlier arrivals among the Latin American groups. Although Puerto Ricans have come to settle in New York since the turn of this century, it was not until after World War II that truly large numbers arrived. In 1940 there were an estimated 61,000 Puerto Ricans in New York City, and by 1950 there were 245,900, according to the Census.

The socioeconomic characteristics of the Puerto Rican community in New York City are rather striking in a negative sense and, as a consequence, dramatically impose themselves on the group’s political behavior. Let us examine some of them.

**INCOME.** A recent government report found that Puerto Ricans “have the lowest incomes in relation to other New Yorkers. Their median family income is little more than half the average for the City. About one-third live at or below the poverty level. Over the past decade, their relative position, already low, got worse.” The Puerto Rican community in New York is largely poor and working class in composition.
EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE. Although Puerto Ricans make up about 13 percent of the city’s population, in the public schools they represent close to a quarter of the student body.\(^{21}\) However, in 1970, in comparison to 51 percent of the white, non-Latin population, only 20 percent of the Puerto Ricans had high school diplomas.\(^{22}\) In other educational indicators, Puerto Ricans fared as badly. In terms of language, which is of course closely related to education, one study of Puerto Rican families in the Lower East Side found that 74 percent of the people used Spanish primarily in the home; 21 percent were bilingual; and only 6 percent identified themselves as English-dominant.\(^{23}\) According to the 1970 Census, 40 percent of adult Puerto Ricans in the United States lacked basic literacy in English.\(^{24}\) Language, obviously, can present a significant procedural barrier to political participation.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION. The historic pattern for Puerto Ricans has been toward increasingly dispersed settlements in the United States, away from New York City. In New York City itself, Puerto Ricans have moved away from earlier concentrations in Manhattan; in contrast to blacks, Puerto Ricans do not constitute a clear majority in any one of the city’s neighborhoods.\(^{25}\) Largely due to the effects of public housing programs and urban renewal, as well as possibly to greater variations in skin color, this situation of population dispersal and circulation has resulted in Puerto Rican concentrations of, at most, around 40 percent in areas such as East Harlem and parts of the South Bronx.\(^{26}\)

These general socioeconomic and spatial characteristics alone point to conditions for political disadvantage. However, another key aspect of the Puerto Rican reality that should be added is the relatively close proximity of Puerto Rico to New York in terms of transportation access. This has allowed for a high degree of movement to and from the island, which, it has been argued, has retarded Puerto Rican assimilation and commitment to life in New York City.\(^{27}\) This has further been sustained by the possession of American citizenship by almost all Island inhabitants since 1917, which in turn took away one traditional political resource used historically by American political parties in the cities --- helping the immigrant gain citizenship.\(^{28}\)

Within this context of forces affecting the Puerto Rican in New York City, I will attempt a description of this group’s participation in the 1978 gubernatorial elections. The unit of analysis used here is the state assembly district (ADs), since it is the smallest political subdivisions and more easily conform to the racial-ethnic character of the city than do congressional, city council, or state senatorial districts.

New York City contains 65 ADs, out of a statewide total of 150. Each AD, based on the 1970 Census, is populated by about 120,000 persons. Puerto Ricans can be said to be a plurality in eight ADs --- located on the Lower East Side and in East Harlem in Manhattan, the northern-most portion of Brooklyn, and in the South Bronx and an area directly north of it in the Bronx --- although they also reside in significant numbers in other areas of the city. Some caution, however, should be taken in interpreting the analysis that uses ADs as the units of
analysis, since over the last decade there have been some population changes affecting the number of eligible voters within each district. Considering the intense debate which has occurred over the New York City Census count, there is really no effective way to resolve this problem at present, except to recognize it as a possible interpretive problem.29

Puerto Ricans, along with blacks, distinguished themselves in the 1978 elections by their low voter turnout, as Table 1 indicates. What becomes clear from these data is that not only was the minority turnout drastically lower than that of the white and non-Latin turnout, but it was only, on the average, about one-third that of the white participants. Even looking at the range of the turnouts, one can see that the maximum turnout in the minority districts did not even approach the level of the minimum turnout in the white ADs.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Puerto Rican</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of ADs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of Turnout</td>
<td>4,972-12,824</td>
<td>5,491-12,500</td>
<td>16,221-34,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Turnout</td>
<td>8,709</td>
<td>8,527</td>
<td>23,786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from New York State Board of Elections, NEWS RELEASE, December 15, 1978

This contrasts even more sharply with the voter turnouts of the adjoining Long Island and upstate suburban counties of Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk. In these counties, which contain 27 ADs, the average turnout was 37,028 --- or 50 percent higher than the New York City average white turnout and more than four times that of the Puerto Rican and black averages.30 In these suburban counties, the turnouts ranged from a low of 25,740 (higher than the average white New York City turnout) to a high of 53,718.31 As already mentioned, this could be partially the result of population shifts within the New York City metropolitan region, but even this fact does not alter the political realities of these disparities.

Within New York City, the divergence in turnout between Puerto Ricans and whites can be further highlighted by distinguishing between the number of votes their respective candidates garnered. Here an especially dramatic contrast emerges. If one takes the votes polled by the sixteen Spanish-surnamed candidates for state assembly in both Puerto Rican and non-Puerto Rican ADs in 1978, including the five who were victorious, the total number amounts to only 41,323.32 This compares to the combined total of 53,307 votes attracted by the top two vote getters in white districts, a figure almost one-third more than the total credited to the sixteen Puerto Rican candidates combined.33

The five Puerto Rican winners of the state assembly seats averaged 6,513 votes each, with the highest polling 9,653.34 Among white assembly victors, the lowest vote getter received 10,297 votes more than the highest Puerto Rican candidate for assemblyman.35 It should also be
noted that this white low was in a district in which the contest was a close one involving the unseating of an incumbent who was at the time speaker of the state assembly.

Despite low voter turnout, there has been some progress toward a more consistent and expanded base of political representation in recent years. In 1970, for example, in New York City there were no elected Puerto Rican representatives in the city government, although there was one Puerto Rican state senator and three state assemblymen. By 1978, however, Puerto Ricans were elected to three city council seats, two state senate seats, five state assembly seats -- and one to the U.S. House of Representatives. Moreover, one Puerto Rican was appointed to the position of deputy mayor (though he eventually resigned). Thus, within four years, the number of Puerto Rican elected officials rose from four to eleven. The increase in the state legislature prompted state assemblymen José Serrano to speculate about the formation of a Puerto Rican caucus in Albany: “...we just might have enough to at least block certain pieces of legislation .... That kind of a lever can get a lot more state services into our districts.”

Despite these gains, there continues to be a substantial underrepresentation for the Puerto Rican population. In New York City, of the eighteen U.S. representatives, only one is Puerto Rican as this is written; only three of the 43 city council members are Puerto Rican; only two of the city’s 27 state senators; and only five of the city’s 65 state assemblymen. There are other electoral bodies in which there are no Puerto Ricans: the U.S. Senate; the executive offices of the state, city, and boroughs; and the city’s board of estimate. Also, the small numbers in large legislative bodies like the Congress and the state legislature point to the limits of this recently increased level of representation.

Another problem is the lack of Puerto Rican party independence. More than any other group in the city, Puerto Ricans vote overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party, as Table 2 illustrates. It appears that the Democratic Party is in no danger of losing the Puerto Rican vote, even to Liberal Republicans. For example, even Liberal Republicans who had substantial previous support from the Puerto Rican community (such as John Lindsay and Nelson Rockefeller) were unable to attract more than one-third of the Puerto Rican vote to their party. The Democratic Party can thus take the Puerto Rican vote for granted, diminishing the power that this bloc might otherwise wield.

Table 2
Party Voting Percentages by Racial-Ethnic Group, New York City, November 7, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Districts by Racial-Ethnic Composition</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual votes are as follows: Puerto Rican, 69,665; black, 93,793; white, 1,070,376. (due to rounding, percentages may not total 100).

Source: Calculated from New York State Board of Elections, NEWS RELEASE, December 15, 1978.
In terms of the perceived responsiveness of the city administration to community needs, there appears to be a general feeling of disenchantment among blacks and Puerto Ricans. In a survey of 116 Puerto Rican activists conducted by the author in the first half of 1978, more than one-quarter (27 percent) indicated that they viewed the administration of Mayor Koch negatively; 56 percent felt that it has not made any difference at all in meeting their community's needs. Only 15 percent considered the New York City administration in a positive light.

The various dimensions of the Puerto Rican condition --- low socioeconomic status, linguistic differences, proximity of homeland, low voter turnout, underrepresentation, and system unresponsiveness --- although not fully developed here, vividly join to expose this community's political marginality in New York City.

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN PUERTO RICO

Perhaps one of the most striking but least studied aspects of Puerto Rico's political system is that described by Ramirez in his work on social marginalization and political participation on the island:

In the Puerto Rico case we find that, contrary to the situation in other Latin American countries, there exists a high level of participation in elections .... [There also] does not exist significant differences in [voter] abstention in slum and public housing areas with other residential areas.39

Puerto Rico's uniquely high level of electoral participation is especially highlighted in comparison with U.S. participation figures: since 1952, voter turnout for U.S. presidential elections have averaged 61 percent; in Puerto Rico, gubernatorial elections in the same period averaged 80 percent.40

Of particular interest is Ramirez' observation that participation levels in Puerto Rico are not significantly affected by socioeconomic differences in the population. Here, again, a comparison with U.S. participation data is telling. Ramirez studied the political participation patterns of 157 residents of a poor urban municipio in the San Juan metropolitan area, Cataño, where a majority of the families (52 percent) had annual incomes of less than $3 000 and an average educational level of 4.8 years among its adults.41

The levels of participation of these slum residents in Puerto Rico is compared in Table 3 with data from the Verba-Nie study of participation in America consisting of respondents from all socioeconomic strata.42 From their national sample of 2,549 persons, for example, Verba and Nie found that 19 percent had incomes of less than $3,000 and 27 percent had less than a high school education.43 A comparison of these two sets of data is limited in that one sample is based on a unit of analysis that is national, while the other is derived from a much more
limited area. But a survey of the literature on politics in Puerto Rico reveals that the only study that is comparable to the Verba-Nie study is that of Ramirez. Despite its limitations, such a comparison is useful in highlighting the differences between average rates of participation for the entire United States and a very poor section of Puerto Rico.

Table 3
A Comparison of Political Participation
Utilizing a Limited Puerto Rican Sample of 157 Residents of Cataño and a National U.S. Sample of 2,549 Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Puerto Rico (%)</th>
<th>United States (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watched Election Results on Television</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in 1968</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watched Political Programs on Television</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Meetings</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Party Committee Meetings</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked for Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Member</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 2-3 indicates, in Puerto Rico those low income area residents questioned exhibit, in most of the items surveyed, higher levels of participation than the sample of continental U.S. citizens of all socioeconomic levels. This contrast is particularly striking when one considers that one of the important characteristics of the U.S. data is that it falls to significantly lower levels of participation as socioeconomic status declines. This situation has led Ramirez to ask: “What are the reasons that explain that social and economic marginality, features of the slums of Puerto Rico and an index of political marginality in other societies, does not correlate with low electoral participation?”

As already mentioned, the evidence presented above in support of the assertion that political participation in Puerto Rico is not only uniquely high for most of the Western Hemisphere but relatively uniformly high up and down the class structure as well, cannot be said to be totally conclusive since Cataño is but one of more than 400 existing arrabales (slum areas) in Puerto Rico. But as the Ramirez study has illustrated, participation in other modes of political activity among those with low socioeconomic status in Puerto Rico is also comparatively high.
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCES IN PUERTO RICAN PARTICIPATION

In the brief preceding overview of Puerto Rican electoral participation patterns in New York City and in Puerto Rico, one finds inconsistencies when one attempts to apply dominant theories of political participation to both cases. The New York City illustration fits the current theoretical orthodoxy fairly well: Puerto Ricans exhibit low levels of participation because of their low socioeconomic status; due to their recent history of migration and the nature of that process, they display low levels of commitment to the city;\(^{49}\) and as a non-European racial-ethnic group, they have been subject to relatively systematic discrimination that has had negative effects on the participation levels of this group. The Puerto Rico case, on the other hand, does not fit the standard models so neatly: participation levels are relatively unaffected by socioeconomic level as well as urban-rural differences; and Puerto Rico appears to be unique in its high levels of participation in comparison to the United States and Latin America.\(^{50}\)

As a challenge to the socioeconomic status path to participation, however, the Puerto Rico case is not unique. Verba and Nie, for example, have recognized the need to question the universality of the standard model on a cross-national basis.\(^{51}\) They argue that low levels of participation among lower classes in the United States probably stems from the historical situation in which no agencies for mobilizing on a consciously class basis developed, in contrast to most European countries.\(^{52}\) However, historical conditions in Puerto Rico do not distinguish it in this respect from the United States. The answer would appear to lie elsewhere.

The discussion that follows will therefore explore the viability of structural factors in helping to explain the reasons for the contrast of Puerto Rican electoral participation in both settings. First, each context will be briefly surveyed as to its specific voting institutions. This will be followed by a schematic summary comparison. Finally, in the concluding section, the implications of this contrast for the study of electoral participation, especially for Puerto Ricans and the poor in the United States, will be presented.

PARTICIPATORY STRUCTURES IN PUERTO RICO. In Puerto Rico, politics is primarily characterized by a situation that, Lewis has contended, essentially serves to “blur the distinction between government and party so basic to the Anglo-American democratic system ... The party in effect has become the prisoner of the government.”\(^{53}\) This virtual identification between the colonial bureaucracy and the party in power, it appears, lies at the heart of explaining the high level of electoral participation on the island.

While an important source of this present state of affairs is Puerto Rico’s colonial legacy, as important, or perhaps simply an extension of this legacy, is the almost three decades of continuous tenure in power of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) from 1940 to 1968. This has led to a condition of a dominant party system which has been called “quasi-monopartyism.”\(^{54}\) It is in the rise to power of the PPD and its efforts at power
maintenance that certain crucial structural transformations occur which are most relevant to our discussion.

Before the PPD’s assumption of power, Puerto Rican electoral politics was riddled with corruption. Wells writes of the 1930s in Puerto Rico as a period where corruption was so rampant that it “caused many voters to expect payment for casting their ballots.” He continues with an explanation of the dilemma of the aspiring PPD in attempting to overcome its handicap vis-à-vis the Republican and Liberal parties whose campaign funds were largely financed by the island’s sugar interests.

The PPD’s Muñoz Marín’s nationalist-populist appeals were clearly crucial in his election, but another key was in his securing and maintaining power through the creation and use of the resources of government as a patronage base in response to the superior financial position of the rival parties and in conjunction with certain ruling circles in Washington. The consolidation of this new resource base became particularly important.

This strategy was supported by the increasing role of government in Puerto Rican society during this period. For example, the potential patronage base of government jobs grew dramatically during the tenure of the Populares. According to one study, “the most impressive growth sector for jobs ... was government, which climbed steadily from 2.5 (percent) in 1940 to 15.4 in 1970.” A more recent report found that between 1968 and 1978, government employment increased its share of total employment in Puerto Rico from 14.3 percent to 23.1 percent. This greatly outpaced the growth of government employment during the same period in the United States, which went from 16.5 percent to 17.4 percent.

As this report concluded, “a large component of (government) growth is bureaucratic expansion, perhaps due to the special planning and analysis needs of the Puerto Rican economy.” Another commentator has gone so far as to state that in the early PPD period, “all government programs were conducted with the aim of corrupting democratic processes by means of patronage.” But whatever the case may have been, it is evident that the extent of political patronage in Puerto Rico today remains notorious, although flagrant corruption such as direct vote buying, is not as pervasive as it once was.

The personalistic, highly centralized and disciplined party system, therefore, had some very definite structural relations underlying it. It was able to deliver economically through “invited industrialization” and greatly increased participation in the U.S. welfare apparatus. It also made these gains a form of patronage for the PPD as it established an effective intermediate role by Muñoz Marín, creating thus the basic elements of the classical political party machine. Within a colonial context it becomes possible to see this political arrangement as being conditioned by the center-periphery relationship and paternalistic policies initiated by Spain and continued by the United States.
Although dependent on mass voting, the populism of Muñoz Marín was, as Touraine and Pecault described Latin American populism in general, “highly ambiguous”; “the role of the masses...was that of objects rather than agents.” As Joan Nelson pointed out, “populism is not radical... Basic revamping of the existing social and economic framework is not called for. More specifically, populism usually accepts and defends vigorously the aspirations and rights of the small man to acquire and manage property: land, house, or business.” Its personalistic nature results, in Sennett’s words, in the “narrowing of content in political discourse.”

On the other hand, populism has certain inherent weaknesses and contradictions. Johnson finds that the “most important is the inability of populist regimes to solve the structural crises of development.” Sennett argues that personalistic politics are always problematic in the sense that “modern charisma is order, peaceful order --- and as such it creates crisis.” It was, therefore, on these terms that the PPD came to dominate Puerto Rican politics.

This “capture” of government by a political party, and vice versa, has led to strong party control over the electoral apparatus, one example being that of registration. Here, as Anderson and Lewis have pointed out, the parties recommend personnel to the state elections board, name the officers of the local registration boards, issue voting cards, and have (until recently) full discretion as to whether or not to hold primaries. An important feature of the registration process in Puerto Rico is that it is conducted periodically on a door-to-door, census basis by the government. The combination of widespread patronage practices and party control over an important part of the voting structures greatly increases material incentives to participate. It also provides a certain degree of accountability of the electorate to the party. In his study of participation in a Puerto Rico slum, Ramirez sums up this relation in these terms:

The administration of the Popular Democratic Party...
developed dependence in mayors and local political leaders as a form of getting electoral support. These politicians provided public services as a form of barter for political support of the people in their areas.

One finds that even measures to reform the voting process serve to work in unexpected ways in Puerto Rico. A case in point is the procedure used for casting one’s vote. Up until 1980, colegios cerrados (closed polling stations) had been used. One writer has described it as “the unique system in Puerto Rico of herding voters into a voting place on election day and confining them there until they have cast their vote.” Intended to safeguard the secrecy of the vote, this method, based on neighborhood-level areas, seems to place a considerable degree of peer pressure among proximate residents to vote. Also, because the units it is organized around are relatively small, it helps increase accountability to the party in power.

Of interest is the fact that these practices, nurtured by the long reign of the PPD, apparently became institutionalized. The PPD’s loss at the polls in 1968 to the New Progressive Party
(PNP) has not altered what has been described thus far as the relation between party and government on the island; it has in many ways highlighted the extent of this relationship. Anderson, for example, has described the current party system in Puerto Rico as “a curious kind of two-party populism based on competitive appeals to the unorganized masses.”

Changes in Puerto Rico’s electoral law (Public Law 14 [December 20, 1977] and its amendments) pushed Puerto Rican election procedures closer to the U.S. model. Some of the changes include photo identification registration cards, the introduction of open poll stations, required primaries, and so forth. At the same time, the holding of primaries for U.S. presidential candidates and changes in Stateside-Island party alignments add to a movement of integration of Puerto Rican electoral institutions with those of the United States. One possible long term effect could be lower voter turnout in Puerto Rico, if the analysis of this study is at all accurate and if the 50 percent abstention in the 1980 Democratic Party primary is any indication of things to come.

Within this context, the high levels of electoral participation in Puerto Rico become easier to understand. Two other factors may be added, however. One is that, unlike the United States, Puerto Rican elections are basically held only once every four years and as such are more of an event than a routine procedure. On election day in Puerto Rico, excitement runs high, with political argumentation and an abundance of party flags in display.

Secondly, there are the effects of the political status inconsistencies of the island. This has resulted in what many see as a preoccupation with the status question among Puerto Ricans. The translation of this preoccupation into the gubernatorial elections give these contests an added importance. Whether or not a substantive change in policy on the status question is involved (and in reality, this seems to have become more a symbolic issue as used by the island’s dominant parties), it does serve to link elections to something like the island’s national destiny.

**PUERTO RICANS AND PARTICIPATORY STRUCTURES IN NEW YORK CITY.** In contrast to the strong party system in Puerto Rico, New York City has become subject to the general decline of party politics in the United States. For example, an indicator of the diminution of party electoral reach is the decline in the number of voters by 11 percent in 1978 in comparison with the 1974 gubernatorial elections in New York state, accelerating a drop of 9 percent between the 1970 and 1974 elections.

One reason for this decline in the role of the party and its patronage abilities has to do, in part, with changes in governmental structure. In a discussion relevant to the Puerto Rican situation, Cloward and Piven point to the following as an obstacle to black urban political assimilation:

> [T]he political organization of the cities has changed; the ethnic machine has been superceded by the professional bureaucracies.
With that change, the opportunities for political leaders to dispense benefits in return for allegiance has been diminished, partly because employees entrenched in the bureaucracies now controlled many of the benefits that machine leaders once dispensed to their followers. Civil-service associations and unions of public employees were both ready and able to defend their hard won terrain, and they were doing so at the expense of blacks.74

This decline of the political machine in New York effectively removed key material incentives for participation among the city’s poor.75

In the area of registration, in New York signing up to vote is a highly individual act usually involving a trip to the local board of elections or mailing in forms. There are voter registration campaigns, but these are frequently inadequate and unsystematic citywide efforts. In other words, the act of registering to vote requires a greater degree of motivation than the amount of benefits perceived by the average poor and working person can stimulate. Verba, et al., analyzed the character of the act of voting in the United States from a cross-national perspective in the following terms:

Socioeconomic resources play almost no role --- with the exception of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia ... The fact that it is as affected by the resources and motivation of the individual rather than by institutional affiliation ... highlights the distinctive character of voting in the United States. The reasons probably lie in the fact that voting in the United States is a difficult political act compared with voting in many other nations. Registration is more difficult ... Elections are not held on weekends, and so on. Furthermore it also reflects the weakness of institutions in relation to this particular act.76

Historically, there have been patterns of discrimination against Third World racial-ethnic groups in the United States trying to exercise their right to vote. Until 1964, Puerto Ricans, for instance, were required to take literacy tests in English in New York state before they were able to register.77 Other obstacles involved intimidation, poll taxes, the white primary, gerrymandering, and so on.78 The passage of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments helped to eliminate some of the more flagrant abuses, but certain attitudes and patterns persist that have kept political participation among Puerto Ricans, and the poor in general, low.

There are, as well, other structural factors that serve to lower voter turnout in New York City. One is the impersonality of the voting itself in its highly individualized, almost totally a-
anonymous character, which stems from the extremely large electoral districts and open polling stations. The smallest units, the assembly districts, for example, contain about 120,000 persons each. Another is the virtual trivialization of elections. With off-year contests, special elections, local school board elections, and others in addition to presidential elections, it can be said that there is a degree of “overload” on the average citizen’s motivational baggage with regard to voting duties.

On the whole, for the average Puerto Rican in New York, politics does not appear all that crucial in his or her daily life. There is what has been called the Puerto Rican “commuter” mentality resulting from the almost-continuous back-and-forth movement between island and metropolis of a large segment of this community. This pattern is replicated within New York City by a large number of Puerto Rican families who frequently move from apartment to apartment and neighborhood to neighborhood. For these people, there are no immediate material rewards from politics. They do not perceive political issues as all that crucial (at least insofar as they feel their participation would be decisive). These Puerto Ricans, therefore, have a general feeling of political powerlessness.

IMPLICATIONS OF PUERTO RICAN-NEW YORK CITY DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION

This study of the contrast between the electoral participation of Puerto Ricans in New York City and those in Puerto Rico has some interesting implications for the study of participation in the United States, especially in reference to Third World racial-ethnic groups and other poor people.

First, this comparison has focused on the need to pay more attention to structural and historical factors in the study of participation. This is particularly important in balancing out the present preoccupation of the pluralist-behavioralists with process at the expense of exploring the effects of institutional arrangements/rearrangements and their ideological contents. What we have come to understand is why and how, as Pateman puts it, “systematically structured inequalities appear as individual psychological and personal attributes that happen to be distributed in a particular way,” and not simply the reverse, as most studies on participation are prone to do.80

Second, for Puerto Ricans in New York, this study has pointed to the problem of the structural obstacles and specific socio-historical circumstances in the nature of their migration that impede a fuller participation in American political and social life. On the most superficial level, these include the indirect methods of registration, election “overload,” and so on. More centrally, they involve structures of domination, only alluded to here, that place Puerto Ricans in a subordinate position in what one social scientist calls the prevailing “cultural division of labor.”81
Third, this study indicates the need to go beyond generalizing the circumstances of groups such as blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans under the ubiquitous heading of “minorities.” While many of the important conditions of each group’s situation are similar and have many common sources, each group represents an experience specific to it that needs to be understood and which impacts differently on their relations with political and socioeconomic structures. As this study seeks to show, questions such as the nature of Puerto Rican migration, legal status upon arrival, and residential patterns are specific in many ways to the Puerto Rican experience and are significantly different enough from that of other groups to warrant recognition as such.

Fourth, more generally for the poor and working class in the United States, the evidence indirectly reveals an ideological bias at work in American participatory politics that serves to reduce mass participation and masks the realities and persistence of class cleavages, as well as that attributable to other factors. This bias, as Verba and Nie have shown, dampens participation among those on the bottom of the class structure in the United States. In Puerto Rico, on the other hand, we find the reverse situation in which voters were mobilized on a mass basis utilizing populist appeals to lend legitimacy to a new regime and colonial relationship.

Recent developments have, however, begun to shake the general stability within which such a mobilization of voters was institutionalized. The growing crisis in capitalist countries in general, along with the fiscal crisis of advanced industrial governments and their colonial and neo-colonial appendages, places Puerto Rico in a situation in which dominant groups there and in the metropolitan center have, or may have, to reassess the possible liabilities of such high levels of electoral participation to the stability of the system.

Despite high levels of electoral participation, Puerto Rico is not a society that could be called a paragon of democratic virtues, particularly in light of the notorious persistent and pervasive patronage practices in government. This analysis does not characterize Puerto Rico as superior to the United States in its democratic practices. It merely uses the differences in participation levels as a way of highlighting the problem of interpreting the behavior of poor and working class Puerto Ricans once they enter the American political system as it exists in New York City.

Another parting qualification has to do with the New York City focus of this chapter. Over the last three decades, New York has witnessed a marked decline in its percentage of Puerto Rican population vis-à-vis the United States as a whole, down from 82 percent in 1950 to 59 percent in 1970, according to the U.S. Census. Taking into consideration the city’s unique size and history, one would have to be careful in generalizing from it to all Puerto Rican communities on the mainland. The great variety of settings and differences in when, how, and why Puerto Ricans came to cities such as Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, Los Angeles, and
Miami offer tremendous possibilities for further, and more adequate, comparative research on the Puerto Rican experience.

Paralleling the concerns of this study, Nelson sees in the Puerto Rico-New York comparison of participation a gap in what he calls “assimilation theory,” that, curiously, seems in the end to undermine his own use of the notion of “participant political culture.” He concludes that “assimilation theory implies that all immigrant groups arrive in this country with a political culture less supportive of participation than American political culture” and speculates, based on his own findings, that “such a theory does not account for the possibility that socialization to American culture could decrease the propensity of some immigrant groups to participate in politics.”

Along these same lines, Jennings has expressed serious difficulty with Lane’s finding that “rates of electoral assimilation ... vary more with participation norms of the migrant’s place of origin than with education, sex, or (urban) occupation of the migrants,” which clearly does not hold up in the Puerto Rican case.

What, therefore, emerges as an important problem for Puerto Rican participation are the reasons behind the apparent nontransferability of participatory behaviors from island to city. What gives rise to the relevance of class location to voting turnout in one setting and not in the other? What does the Puerto Rican case say about the use of concepts like “political culture” and “assimilation” in relation to participation levels? A particularly interesting area for future study in this regard would be the political participation rates and patterns of those Puerto Ricans who have returned to Puerto Rico after having grown up in the United States or having resided there for a significant amount of time.

This study has attempted to point to a line of inquiry that can, at least provisionally, begin to provide answers to some of these questions. At the same time, it has pointed to the fact that Puerto Rican political participation itself, when viewed from both its New York City and Puerto Rico contexts, poses some challenging questions to the conventional wisdom of the political involvement of the poor and working classes in the United States and raises the need for a fundamental re-examination of the underlying assumptions of this “wisdom.”

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FOOTNOTES


3. Jennings, pp. 54-72.


Herman Badillo, perhaps the most prominent Puerto Rican politician in the United States, provided an expression of this group-based approach when he argued that Puerto Rican participation cannot be compared with that in New York City because the nature of the groups and their locations were too different. He called this a difference between a “politics of a majority versus a politics of a minority.” The position taken in this chapter is, obviously, that this is not so, and that there are sufficient similarities and interactions to make such a comparison viable. Badillo’s remarks were made at a conference entitled “Puerto Rican Politics and Urban Sociology: The Mainland Experience, The Future,” sponsored by the Hispanic Labor Studies Program of the Cornell-New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, New York, New York, June 13, 1980.


19. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 1975 there were 912,824 Puerto Ricans in New York City. This figure was quoted in THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 19, 1976; it has, however, been challenged as undercounting the actual size of this community. A discussion of the problem can be found in Karl Wagenheim, A SURVEY OF PUERTO RICANS ON THE U.S. MAINLAND IN THE 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 6-9, 41.


22. Ibid.


26. These figures were derived from school district-based data contained in New York City Planning Commission, COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT PROFILES: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS (July 1974). For a brief discussion of some of the causes for this dispersion, see Estades, pp. 37-38, 82.

27. See, for example, Jennings, pp. 56-65.


29. See, for example, Robert Reinhold, “Embattled U.S. Census Is Facing Its First Major Test This Month,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 1980, p. 1; and Maurice Carroll, “Rosenbaum, Scolding Carey, Urges Census Review,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 3, 1980, p. 34.


38. “The Puerto Rican Activist Stratum in New York City: A Preliminary Report,” unpublished paper, State University of New York at Albany, 1979. The response rate for the mailed questionnaire upon which this study was based was 52 percent. It included individuals occupying elective and appointed positions in government, as well as leaders and activists in other areas, such as education, business, media, and culture, who were primarily involved in work on behalf of the Puerto Rican community.


42. Verba and Nie.

43. Ibid.

44. Ramirez, “Marginalidad...,” p. 111.

45. Verba and Nie, pp. 108-109•

46. Ibid., pp. 125-137.


48. The usual finding in comparing U.S. electoral turnouts with higher ones in other countries is that participation in the U.S. has in reality been higher because of greater American citizen involvement in other activities such as voluntary associations; in this regard, in Puerto Rico there is a greater level of comparability with the United States. For the classic work that argues for American participatory “superiority,” see Almond
and Verba. For some critiques of this study, see the reader edited by the same authors: THE CIVIC CULTURE REVISITED (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, 1980).


52. Ibid. For an elaboration of this argument, see Verba, et al., PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL EQUALITY....


56. Ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 2.


61. This is not to say that this practice is widely accepted as ethical by the Puerto Rican populace. For example, a survey of island residents found that 85 percent disagreed with the position that people who are not members of the party in power should be removed from their jobs without taking account of their skills; and 73 percent disagreed with the proposition that for persons to obtain employment, they should first get the endorsement of the party in power. The author of this survey found that in reference to opinion on this issue, “there is an inverted relation with class factors. Those with low socioeconomic status indicators in large part favor the elements of political patronage, and vice-versa.” See Luis Nieves Falcon, LA OPINION PUBLICA Y LAS ASPIRACIONES DE LOS PUERTORRIQUENOS (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria, 1972), pp. 97-100.


66. Sennett, p. 287.


69. Lewis, PUERTO RICO..., p. 324.
70. For an analysis of this process, see Kenneth R. Farr, PERSONALISM AND PARTY POLITICS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF PUERTO RICO (Halo Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University Press, 1973), and Anderson, pp. 231-237.
72. Ibid.
77. Fitzpatrick, pp. 57-58.
82. In New York City, for example, Puerto Ricans are usually uncritically lumped together with blacks when minority problems are discussed. There are, however, ways that this type of identity can lead to misleading analyses and policies. These differences have been explored by Delbert Taebel, “Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure on Blacks and Hispanics,” SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 59 (June 1978), pp. 142-152; and Jennings, pp. 145-169. Additional evidence for this has come from studies done on the data from the New York City Neighborhood Study conducted by the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research: Steven Martin Cohen and Robert E. Kapsis, “Participation of Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Whites in Voluntary Associations: A Test of Current Theories,” SOCIAL FORCES 56 (June 1978), pp. 1053-1071; Dale C. Nelson, “Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status...” and “The Political Behavior of New York Puerto Ricans ....”
83. Verba and Nie, Chapter 8.
85. See Jennings, p. 55; and Robert Lane, POLITICAL LIFE (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959), p• 269.
86. Work along these lines has been done, for example, by Saul Ponce de Leon for the Center for Social Research of the University of Puerto Rico, according to Maldonado-Denis, p. 17.